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INTRODUCTION
The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is a phrase that many people
have never heard. This phrase, however, represents one of the most
important calculations in environmental and energy regulation. The
SCC is defined by the Environmental Protection Agency as “an
estimate of the economic damages associated with a small increase in
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, conventionally one metric ton, in a
given year.”1 The SCC allows climate change policymakers to
calculate the benefit in regard to the reduction of CO2 emissions.2 The
calculation of the SCC has allowed federal agencies to conduct a
proper cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of environmental regulatory
 J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. I would like to thank Professor Hal Morris, our Executive Editors
Emily Linehan and Stephen Pigozzi, and peer editor David E. Braden for all of their
help in writing this article.
1
John Wihbey, Understanding the Social Cost of Carbon—and Connecting It
to Our Lives, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Feb. 12, 2015),
http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2015/02/understanding-the-social-cost-ofcarbon-and-connecting-it-to-our-lives/.
2
Jason S. Johnston, The Social Cost of Carbon, REG., Spring 2016, at 36,
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2016/4/regulationv39n1-4.pdf.
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actions.3 The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for
imposing mandatory energy conservation standards to decrease energy
consumption and decrease CO2 emissions.4 A central policy of the
DOE is to ensure national safety by addressing its “energy,
environmental and nuclear challenges through transformative science
and technology solutions.”5
The DOE is responsible for imposing mandatory energy
conservation standards.6 In doing so, the agency must review these
standards and, when necessary, implement new standards.7 The
implementation of new standards requires the DOE to abide by certain
statutory requirements.8 One statutory requirement mandates that the
agency to ensure the standards are technologically feasible and
economically justified.9 This economic justification requirement tasks
the DOE with conducting a cost-benefit analysis.10
In Zero Zone, Inc. v. United States Department of Energy (Zero
Zone), the Seventh Circuit addressed a case involving a CBA
performed by the DOE, in which the agency used the SCC as a factor
in its analysis.11 The DOE implemented new regulations, known as
The New Standards Rule which reduced the standard of energy
allowance for commercial refrigeration equipment (CRE).12 The DOE
performed a cost-benefit analysis to ensure the New Standards Rule
satisfied the statutory framework by being economically justified.13
Policies are considered to be economically justified when the benefits
3

Id.
Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2016).
5
Mission, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/mission (last visited Nov. 20,
2016).
6
Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 662.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 664.
13
Id. at 666.
4

237
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/9

2

Kita: Social Cost of Carbon: Can We Afford It?

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

of the standard exceed its burdens.14 While the benefit of the standard
may exceed the burden, the burden can still result in a staggering
figure that will fall on the shoulders of manufacturers.15 However, on
the opposite end of the spectrum, the benefit can outweigh the cost by
providing a net benefit to consumers; which was precisely what the
New Standards Rule accomplished by providing a benefit between
$4.93 and $11.74 billion.16 The DOE must balance the costs and the
benefits to ensure the burden is not too great for manufacturers, which
will likely then be transferred onto consumers.
However, the benefit may exceed the burden even though some
manufacturers may be unable to bear the costs.17 In Zero Zone, Zero
Zone, Inc., Heating Refrigeration Institute, and North American
Association of Food Equipment Manufacturers (collectively,
Petitioners) challenged the regulations imposed by the DOE, as well as
the inclusion of the SCC when conducting a cost-benefit analysis.18
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the DOE and upheld the use of the
SCC to project the harms caused by carbon dioxide emissions.19
Part I of this article provides an overview of the SCC. Part II
provides an overview of relevant statutes and case law that provides a
foundation for agencies to consider the SCC. Part III examines the
facts of Zero Zone and the court’s reasoning in upholding the use of
SCC. Finally, Part IV will explain why the Seventh Circuit’s use of the
SCC in a regulatory cost-benefit analysis was appropriate.

14

42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(o)(2)(B) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244).
See Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 666 (“DOE then determined that the
development of new CRE would cost manufacturers between $93.9 and $165
million”).
16
Id. at 666.
17
Id. at 683. The DOE concluded that “small businesses will likely have
greater increases in component costs than large businesses, and may have greater
difficulty obtaining credit.” Id.
18
Id. at 667.
19
Id. at 660.
15
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THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
The SCC has become one of the most important potential factors
in an environmental cost-benefit analysis. The SCC has the ability to
tip the scales in favor of a standard or regulation being considered
beneficial as opposed to burdensome. For example, in 2006 the
Environmental Protection Agency estimated the industry cost of its
greenhouse gas tailpipe regulation for light-duty gasoline-powered
cars and trucks to be around $350 billion.20 The agency concluded that
the regulation would result in a $280 billion public benefit.21 At this
point the burden outweighed the benefit, which rendered the regulation
as economically unjustified. However, the Environmental Protection
Agency then added the SCC as a potential benefit that can be
quantified.22 The regulation’s net cost of $70 billion was suddenly
extinguished, and the regulation resulted in a net public benefit of
$100 billion.23 Thus, the SCC has the potential to make a major impact
when evaluating the effectiveness of environmental and energy
regulations. The following section analyzes the development of the
SCC and how it is calculated.
A. The Ninth Circuit Requires Administrative Agency to Consider
CO2 Emissions
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a petition by eleven states,
District of Columbia, the City of New York, and four public interest
organizations that challenged a rule issued by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.24 The rule set corporate average fuel
economy standards for light trucks, minivans, and pickup trucks.25 The
20

Johnston, supra note 2, at 36.
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir.
2008).
25
Id.
21
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petitioners argued the rule was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act because:
(a) the agency’s cost-benefit analysis does not set the
[corporate average fuel economy] standard at the
maximum feasible level and fails to give consideration to
the need of the nation to conserve energy; [and] (b) its
calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative fuel
economy standards assigns zero value to the benefit of
CO2 emissions reduction.26
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration argued that there
is an “extremely wide variation in published estimates of damage costs
from greenhouse gas emissions, costs for controlling or avoiding their
emissions, and costs of sequestering emissions that do occur, the three
major sources for developing estimates of economic benefits from
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.”27 In other words, the parties
disagreed on whether calculating the cost of reducing CO2 emissions
was necessary and reliable.
The Ninth Circuit held that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s reasoning was arbitrary and capricious.28 The Court
conceded that the value of carbon emissions reduction may be difficult
to ascertain because the value may have a wide range of values.29
However, the Court concluded that the value of carbon emissions
reduction is “certainly not zero.”30 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
petitioners that the scientifically supported values of carbon emission
reduction demonstrated that it is possible to monetize the benefit of
reducing carbon emission.31 The Ninth Circuit determined that the cost
of carbon emissions reduction can, and should, be calculated.
26

Id.
Id. at 1192.
28
Id. at 1199.
29
Id. at 1200.
30
Id.
31
Id. The court noted that the range of values does not begin at $0 so there
must be some calculable value. Id.
27
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B. 2010 Technical Support Document
The Obama administration established the SCC.32 The
administration published the Technical Support Document (“Support
Document”) which provides an overview of the SCC.33 The Support
Document states that the purpose of the SCC is to “allow agencies to
incorporate the social benefits of reducing [CO2] emissions into a
cost-benefit analysis of regulatory actions that have small, or marginal,
impacts on cumulative global emissions.”34 However, the Support
Document concedes that uncertainties and model differences result in
a range of SCC estimates.35
The Support Document defines the SCC as “an estimate of the
monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon
emissions in a given year.”36 The SCC is intended to account for the
changes in net agriculture productivity, human health, property
damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem
services due to climate change.37 However, the SCC is still considered
to be provisional.38 The Support Document includes recognition that a
number of key uncertainties remain regarding the current SCC
estimates; however, these estimates are predicted to evolve with
improved understanding of the scientific and economic factors
involved in determining the SCC.39 The United States government
32

Cass R. Sunstein, A Court Ruling That Could Save the Planet, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-12/a-courtruling-that-could-save-the-planet.
33
Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost of Carbon, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 1 (August 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201612/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf. [hereinafter 2010 Support Document].
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 2.
38
Id. at 4.
39
Id.
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must periodically review and reconsider estimates of the SCC used for
cost-benefit analyses to ensure the SCC value is accurate based on
scientific development.40
There are three integrated assessment models (IAMs) used to
estimate the SCC,41 which combine “climate processes, economic
growth, and feedbacks between the climate and the global economy
into a single modeling framework.”42 Some may view use of global
factors in determining the SCC as controversial. However, any
international concerns are moot because the SCC does not give
extraterritorial effect to a federal law and “hence does not intrude on
such interests,” meaning the SCC does not impose any costs or
regulations on foreign sovereigns.43 Additionally, the SCC considers
many other additional factors such as: the valuing of non-CO2
emissions, equilibrium climate sensitivity, socio-economic and
emissions trajectories, and discount rates.44
C. Calculating the SCC
IAMs are used to establish the SCC estimates that are used in rule
making.45 The three models that are used to compute the SCC were
academically developed and are widely used in estimating future
climate harms.46 These models allow a user to enter a set of economic

40

Id.
Id. at 5. The three models used to formulate the SCC are: DICE (Dynamic
Model of Integrated Climate and the Economy), PAGE (Policy Analysis of the
Greenhouse Effect), and FUND (Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation,
and Distribution).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 10 (referencing to the fact that the United States cannot enact federal
statutes that have an extraterritorial effect to ensure that U.S. laws respect the
interests of foreign sovereigns).
44
See id. at 13–23.
45
Johnston, supra note 2, at 36.
46
Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of CostBenefit Analysis, 99 CAL, L. REV. 1557, 1577 (2011).
41
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parameters47 which includes projections about future greenhouse gas
emissions.48 The models use the projected emissions to predict
changes in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.49
The changes in greenhouse gases are used to predict changes in the
temperature, which in turn allow the models to project economic
harms from the expected temperature increases.50
The Interagency Work Group (IWG), which was formed to create
the SCC51, ran these three models and used standard baseline
projections of economic growth and technological development to
determine the predicted effects that warming has on the nation’s gross
domestic product.52 The IWG obtained the mean outcome for each
model and averaged the three results together which resulted in the
baseline average reduction in gross domestic product.53 The IWG reran the models, but did so with one additional ton of carbon emissions
to determine the marginal effect on global gross domestic product of
the additional unit of carbon.54 The result of the equation was then
subtracted from the baseline which resulted in the SCC.55 For an
agency to calculate the benefits of carbon reduction in federal
regulations, it would multiply the emissions avoided by the price of a
ton of emissions for the appropriate year.56

47

Id. at 1578. The economic parameters include preexisting baseline
projections of economic grown and technological improvement. Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
2010 Support Document, supra note 33, at 2.
52
Masur, supra note 47, at 1578.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1579 (“[T]he social cost of carbon: the amount of money saved for
every marginal ton of carbon that is not emitted.”).
56
Id.
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BACKGROUND
The creation of the SCC arose from the need to calculate the cost
of CO2 reduction to have a proper CBA.57 However, agencies cannot
simply create the SCC and apply without statutory authority.
A. Administrative Procedure Act
A court must look to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
when deciding relevant questions of law and determining the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.58 The reviewing court
must hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings, and
conclusions that are found to be (a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (b) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (c) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right; (d) without observance of procedure required by law; and
(e) unsupported by substantial evidence.59 Courts determine whether
an agency’s decision is arbitrary or capricious by inquiring whether the
agency “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that is counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”60
Agencies must follow the APA when implementing new regulations.
B. Chevron Doctrine
“The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created…program necessarily requires the
57

2008).

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir.

58

5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-224).
Id.
60
Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 668 (7th Cir. 2016).
59

244
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”61
Congress cannot account for every possible gap in the formulation
of a policy or the making of a rule. Congress may explicitly delegate
for an agency to clarify or fill any provisional gaps.62 Congress may
also implicitly delegate authority to an agency.63 The Chevron
Doctrine, announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., refers to a defense by a governmental agency which allows the
court to show deference to the agency’s interpretation of a law it
administers.64 The court must perform a two-part test when reviewing
an agency’s construction of a statute.65 The first step is to determine
whether Congress has spoken directly regarding the precise question at
issue.66 The court and agency must adhere to the express intent of
Congress if the intent is unambiguous and clear.67 However, if a court
determines that Congress did not directly address the precise question
at issue, the court will then examine whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.68 The court should
not impose its own construction on the statute if an agency has already
done so.69 An agency’s regulations are given controlling weight unless
the regulations are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.70 Courts have generally held that there should be considerable

61
62

(1984).

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843

63

Id. at 844.
Id. at 842.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 842–43.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 843.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 844.
64
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weight attributed to an executive department’s construction of a
statutory scheme.71
C. EPCA and Regulating CRE’s
Congress has been active in pursuing the protection of the
environment. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA)
authorizes the DOE to impose mandatory energy conservation
standards.72 The EPCA creates certain parameters that the DOE must
abide by to properly establish energy conservation standards that will
satisfy statutory requirements.73 One primary purpose of the EPCA is
to improve the energy efficiency of equipment and appliances.74 The
EPCA directs the DOE to review energy conservation standards and to
implement new ones when it is appropriate.75
Congress has established a framework that the DOE must follow
when establishing new energy conservation standards.76 First, the
DOE may not impose standards that increase the maximum allowable
energy use of any individual unit.77 Second, the standards must be
designed to achieve the “maximum improvement in energy
efficiency”, and the standards must be “technologically feasible and
economically justified.”78 The EPCA also requires that the DOE
establish testing procedures that will measure the energy use of any
covered equipment.79 The result of these measures will require the
DOE to conduct a cost-benefit analysis that will measure the burden
placed on manufacturers versus the benefit gained by the public by

71

Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2016)
77
42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(o)(1).
78
Id. § 6295(o)(2).
79
Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 663.
72
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reducing carbon. Congress amended the EPCA in 2005 to specifically
include CRE’s in the industrial equipment category. 80
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created standards for different
classes of CRE.81 The act also called for the DOE to set standards for
any additional classes of CRE that the EPCA did not address.82 Thus,
congress gave the DOE clear instructions to prescribe standards
regarding CRE. In 2009, the DOE added 39 more CRE classes that
were defined by a combination of the equipment’s geometry, door
type, condensing-unit configuration, and its operating temperature.83
Congress further amended CRE requirement under the American
Energy Manufacturing Technical Corrections Act. The act
implemented specific standards for self-contained commercial
refrigerators with transparent doors.84 The DOE must set standards for
CRE that Congress does not explicitly set a standard for, and that
require regulation to conserve energy.
D. Executive Order 12866
Executive order 12866 was issued by President Clinton in 1993.85
The order requires agencies to design regulations in the most costeffective manner to achieve the regulatory objective.86 In doing so,
each agency must access both the costs and the benefits of the
intended regulation.87 The order recognizes that some of these costs
and benefits may be difficult to quantify.88 Each agency should
80

Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 663–64.
85
Summary of Executive Order 12866, ENV. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-executive-order-12866-regulatoryplanning-and-review (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
86
Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed.Reg. 51,735 (1993).
87
Id.
88
Id.
81
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propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.89
E. Colorado District Court Requires Agency to Use SCC
In July 2013, environmental organizations sought judicial review
of three agency decisions by the Bureau of Land Management that,
when taken together, authorized on-the-ground mining exploration
activities in a part of the North Fork Valley, located in western
Colorado.90 Plaintiffs alleged that the agency decisions failed to
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the
APA.91 The agency provided “an adequate disclosure of effects on
adjacent lands.”92 However, the issue stemmed from the agency’s
treatment of the costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions,
which the court held to be arbitrary and capricious.93 The agency
failed to evaluate all of the effects of a proposed action which includes
analyzing direct, indirect, and cumulative effects as is required to be
done under NEPA.94
The agency quantified the amount of emissions relative to state
and national emissions; however the agency failed to quantify the
impacts on global climate change.95 Instead, the agency simply
provided an explanation as to why the analysis would be impossible.96
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado rejected
the argument because such a tool was available.97 The SCC was
designed to quantify a project’s contribution to costs associated with
89

Id.
High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d
1174, 1181 (D. Colo. 2014).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1189.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1190.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
90
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global climate change.98 The court provided further support for the
validity of the SCC by referencing the Environmental Protection
Agency’s support and use of it.99 Plaintiff’s petition for review of the
agency action was granted and sustained, and the court immediately
enjoined the defendants from proceeding in any manner that included
construction.100 The court reasoned that the environmental impact
statement contained a factually inaccurate justification by omitting the
SCC.101 However, the court noted that agencies do not always have to
use the SCC as they may have a justifiable reason for not doing so.102
F. D.C. Circuit Upholds Agency’s Decision to Ignore SCC
Several environmental organizations petitioned to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia for review of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) “conditional authorization of the
Cove Point liquefied natural gas facility from an import maritime
terminal to a mixed-use, import and export terminal.”103 Petitioners
argued that FERC failed to consider several possible environmental
impacts that the Cove Point conversation project may have.104 In
particular, petitioners challenged FERC’s failure to use an SCC
analysis or a similar analytical tool to analyze the environmental
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from the construction, operation,
and conversation of the Cove Point facilities.105 The court denied the
petitioners relief and held that FERC was not required to consider
climate impacts under NEPA.

98

Id.
Id.
100
Id. at 1201.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1193.
103
EarthReports, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 828 F.3d 949, 951
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
104
Id. at 951–52.
105
Id. at 956.
99
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NEPA requires federal agencies to “include an environmental
impact statement in every recommendation or report on proposals
for… major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment…”106 Agencies whose procedures do not require
preparation of an environmental impact statement must first prepare an
environmental assessment.107 An environmental assessment briefly
provides sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to
prepare an environmental impact statement.108
FERC acknowledged the availability of the SCC but concluded
that, “it would not be appropriate or informative to use for this
project.”109 The agency provided three reasons: (1) the lack of
consensus on the appropriate discount rate leads to significant
variation in output, (2) the tool does not measure the actual
incremental impacts of a project on the environment, and (3) there are
no established criteria identifying the monetized values that are to be
considered significant for NEPA purposes.110 Petitioners disagreed
with FERC’s assessment, but the court dismissed their argument
stating that the petitioners failed to identify another method other than
using the SCC that FERC could have used to determine how the
“project’s incremental contribution to [greenhouse gas emissions]
would result in physical effects on the environment, either locally or
globally.”111 The court determined that the petitioners failed to provide
a reason to doubt the reasonableness of FERC’s conclusion that
applying the SCC was not appropriate.112

106

Id. at 953.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 956.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
107
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ZERO ZONE, INC. V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
In Zero Zone, Petitioners challenged the substance of the rules set
forth by the DOE regarding CREs and the decision-making process.113
Zero Zone, Inc. is a small business that specializes in CREs.114 The
Air-Conditioning, Heating and Refrigeration Institute is a trade
association of CRE manufacturers. Both parties petitioned for review
of the New Standards and the 2014 Test Procedure Rule (“Test
Procedure”).115 The motion was granted by the Seventh Circuit for
review.116 The Seventh Circuit determined that the DOE acted in a
manner that was worthy of court deference.117 The New Standards
Rule was premised on analytical models that were considered to have
substantial evidence in support of it.118 As a result, the New Standards
Rule was not arbitrary nor capricious.119 This section reviews the facts
of Zero Zone and the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning for their holding.
A.

The New Standards Rule

In 2010, the DOE began the process of revising CRE energy
efficiency standards. The agency published a sixty-page framework
and a notice regarding the proposal of new CRE energy efficiency

113

Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2016).
The EPCA grants the Seventh Circuit jurisdiction to hear the case. Zero Zone was
petitioned directly to the Seventh Circuit. 42 U.S.C.A. 6311(9)(A) (West, Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 114-224) (“Any person who will be adversely affected by a rule
prescribed under section 6293, 6294, or 6295 of this title may, at any time within 60
days after the date on which such rule is prescribed, file a petition with the United
States court of appeals for the circuit in which such person resides or has his
principal place of business, for judicial review of such rule.”).
114
Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 661.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
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standards.120 Additionally, the DOE published a technical support
document for the proposed rule, and also held a public meeting to
solicit feedback and provide preliminary responses regarding the
proposed rules.121
The proposal listed new standards for forty-nine classes of CRE.
The classes were defined by a combination of the equipment’s
geometry, door type, condensing-unit configuration, and operating
temperature.122 The proposed rule established the maximum daily
energy consumption for each class of CRE which would be
determined by either the unit’s refrigerated volume or by the unit’s
total display area (TDA).123 The DOE set forth higher standards for
energy consumption that applied to forty-one equipment classes which
they determined were both technologically feasible and economically
justified.124
The DOE determined the appropriate standard for each class by
using a design-option engineering analysis.125 Here, the DOE chose to
use a representative unit from each class of CRE.126 Then, the DOE
calculated how much it would cost manufacturers to implement more
efficient components into their CRE units.127 The DOE also calculated
the daily energy consumption that would result from manufactures
implementing the more efficient components.128 The DOE used these
calculations to determine what would be a feasible maximum energy

120

Id. at 667. The notice of proposed rulemaking for the New Standards Rule
was issued on September 11, 2013. Id. at 667 n. 9.
121
Id. at 667.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. The DOE did not make any changes regarding eight equipment classes
and the standards for aforementioned classes remained consistent with the 2009
Final Rule. Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. The DOE chose a unit that was toward the larger end of that class. Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
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consumption level for a unit of that size.129 The calculation served as a
launching point for the DOE, which it used to establish an equation to
determine a CRE unit’s maximum energy consumption level.130 This
standard was meant to be used in the 2009 Final Rule; however, the
DOE received negative feedback regarding the effect their equation
would have on smaller units.131 Thus, the DOE decided to allow
manufacturers to use any design path that was most convenient for
them.132
The DOE, in order to satisfy statutory requirements, considered
whether the New Standards were economically justified.133 To do so,
the agency created five potential trial standard levels of energy
efficiency that would be required by each class.134 It then conducted a
cost-benefit analysis for each level, and concluded that the thirdhighest level would offer the maximum improvement in efficiency that
is technologically feasible and economically justified while still
resulting in significant energy conservation.135 Per requirement, the
DOE requested a letter from the United States Department of Justice
wherein the department determined the New Standards would not have
an anticompetitive effect.136
The DOE officially put the New Standards into effect after it
concluded that the benefits outweighed the costs per the statutorily
imposed economic justification requirement.137
129

Id. The DOE ranked the components in order of cost and drew a costefficiency curve to determine what would be feasible. Id.
130
Id. at 665.
131
Id. The DOE considered the comments and established an “offset” factor
for each class. This allowed smaller equipment to consume more energy. Id.
132
Id. This allowed manufacturers to retain features they found valuable while
still manufacturing equipment that fell within the New Standard. Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 666.
137
Id. (Development of new CRE would cost manufacturers between $93.9
and $165 million. The benefit to consumers would be between $4.93 and $11.74
billion).
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B. The 2014 Test Procedure Rule
The New Standards requires a test procedure to be used in
conjunction with the standards.138 The Test Procedure includes a
method on how to calculate the TDA of CRE.139 The equation requires
certain measurements of the unit to be entered into a general
equation.140 One measurement is the “Length of Commercial
Refrigerated Display Merchandiser” (LCR). The DOE’s New
Standards make the LCR directly proportional to a CRE unit’s
maximum energy consumption level.141
The DOE published the proposed method to solicit comments.142
The LCR included the total length of the transparent area on CRE, but
it did not include any opaque or non-transparent areas.143 This irked
several manufacturers who submitted comments opposing the
definition of the LCR arguing that it went against the common
industry standard.144 The DOE took these comments into account and
revised their testing procedure rule to include the industry standard.145
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding
The Seventh Circuit considered the challenges to: (1) the DOE’s
engineering analysis; (2) the DOE’s economic analysis; (3) the DOE’s
regulatory flexibility analysis regarding the effect the New Standards
may have on small businesses; (4) the DOE’s assessment of the
cumulative regulatory burden; and (5) the 2014 Test Procedure Rule.
138

Id.
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. The longer the display on a CRE unit, the more energy a CRE unit is
allowed to consume on a daily basis. Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. The common industry standard measured the LCR by measuring the
CRE unit’s inside wall to inside wall, which would “disregard the presence of nontransparent mullions and door frames. Id.
145
Id.
139
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1. Engineering Analysis
The Petitioners challenged the DOE’s engineering analysis
arguing that the DOE did not provide an opportunity for comments
regarding the DOE’s engineering spreadsheet.146 The Seventh Circuit
rejected this argument because the DOE did provide two technical
support documents that presented all of the necessary data regarding
the New Standards.147 The court held that the data not being organized
into a spreadsheet was irrelevant because all of the underlying data
contained in the spreadsheet was present in the technical support
documents.148
Petitioners also challenged the technologically feasible energy
consumption level for each class.149 The challenge addressed the
DOE’s modeling of compressors.150The DOE concluded that a high
efficiency single speed hermetic compressor would be ten percent
more efficient than the standard level compressor.151 This was
challenged by several manufacturers who were able to persuade the
DOE that the figure was inaccurate.152 The DOE then applied an
estimate presented by a single manufacturer and settled on the
efficiency being two percent.153 Petitioners argued this figure was too
inaccurate to rely on the estimate by a single manufacturer.154
However, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the Petitioners contention
stating that the chosen figure is supported by substantial evidence and
was reached through a reasoned decision making process.155 Further,
the Seventh Circuit stated they have a limited role because courts only
146

Id. at 670.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 671.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 672.
154
Id.
155
Id.
147

255
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/9

20

Kita: Social Cost of Carbon: Can We Afford It?

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

require that an agency acknowledge factual uncertainties and identify
the considerations it found persuasive in making its decision.156
Another challenge by Petitioners focused on the insulation foam
thickness. Petitioners questioned the validity of the New Standards by
arguing that the DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it
modeled the insulation component.157 The Petitioners pointed out that
the recommended increase in insulation foam thickness would not be
possible for certain refrigerators and freezers because of limited floor
space.158 The Seventh Circuit once again dismissed Petitioner’s
contention stating that the DOE provides manufacturers with the
choice to use alternative methods if redesigning the insulation is not an
available design option.159 The Seventh Circuit held that this cannot be
arbitrary or capricious because it was based on substantial evidence.160
2. Economic Analysis
The EPCA requires that efficiency standards be economically
justified.161 Petitioners argued that the economic standards were
unjustified.162 First, the Petitioners argued that the DOE acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it assumed that the new CRE
standards would not result in “significant changes” in purchasing
behavior.163 The DOE treated CRE to be price inelastic.164 The DOE
admitted to having inadequate information regarding CRE customer
behavior.165 The DOE therefore made a prediction about the CRE
156

Id.
Id. at 673.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 673–74.
160
Id. at 674.
161
42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-224).
162
Id.
163
Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 675.
164
Id. Price inelasticity is when an increase in price does not impact the
amount being purchased. Id.
165
Id.
157
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market, which the Seventh Circuit held was not arbitrary or
capricious.166 The DOE’s prediction regarding market elasticity was
that businesses would continue to purchase CRE regardless of the
price because it would be necessary for them to comply with health
code regulations.167 Businesses must store their food at proper
temperatures to comply with health code regulations, which is an
example as to why the purchase of CRE would continue.168 The
DOE’s argument is helped by the fact that there is a lack of
alternatives to CRE.
Second, Petitioners challenged the use of SCC in the DOE’s
environmental benefits analysis. The Petitioners argue that the EPCA
does not allow for the consideration of environmental factors.169
Additionally, the Petitioners claimed the DOE’s analysis of the SCC
was arbitrary and capricious.170 The Seventh Circuit determined that
Congress did intend for the DOE to have the ability to consider the
reduction in SCC.171 The Seventh Circuit reasoned it was reasonable
to conclude that the EPCA “requires the DOE to consider the need for
national energy…conservation”; the Court went on to say that it is
appropriate to measure the expected reduction in environmental costs
in a cost-benefit analysis.172 The Petitioners also challenge the use of
the SCC arguing that: “(1) who exactly worked on the SCC analysis
had not been made public; (2) the inputs to the models were not peer
reviewed; and (3) the damages functions, or variables based on
problems like sea level rise, were determined in an arbitrary
manner.”173 The DOE admitted that the SCC has limitations.174 The
DOE cited to multiple parties that referenced the SCC values such as a
166

Id. at 676.
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 677.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 678.
174
Id.
167
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2010 interagency group report and the Office of Management and
Budget’s Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review.175
Petitioners argued that the DOE erroneously considered the global
benefits to the environment while only considering the national
costs.176 The EPCA only concerns national energy and water
conservation.177 The DOE responded by noting that climate change
policies effect the entire world.178 The Petitioners argument regarding
the lack of consideration for global costs fell short because they do not
provide any estimation or example of global costs.179
Lastly, Petitioners challenged the anticompetitive effects the New
Standards would have. Petitioners argue that the DOJ’s letter was not
adequate in its reasoning, and that the submission and publication of
the DOJ letter were untimely.180 The Seventh Circuit dismissed both
arguments. First, the Seventh Circuit held that the EPCA places the
burden on the DOJ to provide adequate reasoning, not the DOE
regarding anti-competitive measures.181
THE SCC SHOULD BE USED IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY
REGULATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
The Seventh Circuit denied the Petitioners’ challenge to the
DOE’s New Standards and Test Procedure. More importantly, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the use of the SCC, holding that the use of the
SCC in a cost-benefit analysis is not arbitrary or capricious. This
section will present the drawbacks of the SCC. Also, it will discuss

175

Id.
Id.
177
42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(o)(2)(B)(i)(VI) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
114-244).
178
Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 679.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 680.
181
Id. at 681–82. The DOE has a “secondary role under the [anti-competitive]
provision of the EPCA.” Id.
176
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why the Seventh Circuit was correct in its holding that the SCC is not
arbitrary or capricious.
A. The SCC is Not Perfect
The SCC is a useful tool for agencies when creating
regulations.182 It allows the agency to factor in CO2 costs, which
previously agencies were unable to do. However, the SCC is not
perfect.
The SCC has been referred to as a “black box” by one member of
Congress.183 The concern regarding the use of the SCC is that it will
continue to be used in a variety of economically significant rules
despite the fact that the settled upon figure is highly controversial
among experts.184 Also, the amount of benefit the SCC may add to a
CBA makes it difficult for opponents of a regulation to rebuke the
CBA. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency quantified
that potential regulations, regarding tailpipe emissions, would result in
a $280 billion benefit while being outweighed by a $350 billion
cost.185 The regulation would have failed, but for the addition of the
SCC into the cost-benefit analysis which caused the proposed
regulation to result in a net benefit of $100 billion and making the
benefit a total of $380 billion.186
The SCC gives agencies a tool that can extrapolate the benefit,
thereby allowing regulations in danger of failing a cost-benefit
analysis to survive scrutiny. The SCC benefit may vary in different
situations, but the SCC can account for over half of the benefit of a
regulation. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
published emission guidelines regarding new and existing power
182

High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d
1174, 1190–91 (D. Colo. 2014).
183
Jay G. Stirling, Note, How to Deal with Hornets: The Administrative
Procedure Act and the Social Cost of Carbon, 100 IOWA L. REV. 854, 857 (2011).
184
See Id. at 856.
185
Johnston, supra note 2, at 36.
186
Id.
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plants; the SCC accounted for 40-65% of the projected benefits.187 The
application of the SCC can therefore have a great impact on CBA and
allow more environmentally friendly regulations to pass.
The cost of carbon may be difficult to grasp due to its size, given
the industrial-size dollar figures.188 However, the figure is much easier
to comprehend when applied to the average American. For example,
the activities of a single American produces roughly eighteen tons of
CO2 per year.189 It is estimated that a third of that comes from
transportation.190 If you multiply the 18 tons by the SCC, the amount
comes to $222, which represents how much the daily commute costs
in societal damages each year.191 This figure, however, may be much
larger depending on your calculation of the SCC. For example, two
Stanford researchers have estimated the SCC to cost $220 per ton.192
Using this figure, the average daily commute damages come out to be
somewhere around $1,320 each year.193 This illustrates the wide range
of results that may occur depending on which calculation of the SCC
is used. Additionally, it creates a problem for the government when
trying to calculate the SCC. If the government adopted the Stanford
figure it would make it nearly impossible for businesses to challenge
regulations successfully.194
Some experts argue that the SCC uses flawed, or inaccurate,
estimates when being calculated. The SCC estimate is based on
IAMs.195 The main issue with the IAM is that the modeler has freedom
in choosing the forms, values and inputs that are used to calculate the

187

Stirling, supra note 157, at 856.
Wihbey, supra note 1.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. (This is about a $1,100 difference per year).
194
See supra notes 159-160. The SCC adds to the benefit in a cost-benefit
analysis which may result in the benefit surpassing the burden).
195
2010 Support Document, supra note 33, at 3.
188
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SCC.196 The model uses six different elements.197 Interestingly the
application of this model resulted in two significantly outcomes. Two
different publications, Nordhaus (2008) and Stern (2007), applied
assumptions regarding discount rates, abatement costs, parameters
affecting temperature change, and the function determining economic
impact to determine what the SCC should be.198 Nordhaus concluded
that the SCC should be around or less than $20 a ton while Stern
concluded the SCC should be above $200 a ton.199 This glaring
difference is a result of the assumptions that each person applied.200
This demonstrates the consistency issue that is present in the SCC. The
model depends on assumptions, which is what models do, but the
assumptions vary so significantly that one model of the estimated cost
of the SCC can be ten times larger than another model.201
Environmental and energy regulations attempt to reduce
environmental harm by imposing stricter standards on businesses.
Agencies who implement these regulations hope to provide a benefit
to the public. However, these regulations force businesses to adapt to
be in compliance. Compliance costs placed upon manufacturers
because of the SCC will likely be transferred onto customers. For
instance, the Obama administration estimates that a socially efficient
carbon price would be $36 per ton.202 This tax will translate to $0.36
per gallon at the gasoline pump.203 This is a significant increase in gas
prices that would affect all Americans.

196

Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?,
51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 860, 863 (2013).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
See id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
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B. The SCC is a Beneficial Tool to Use in a Cost-Benefit Analysis
The SCC may not be perfect, but it is a useful tool to use a costbenefit analysis. Agencies should have the ability to utilize the SCC,
and if they decide not to, provide a basis as to why they believe the use
of it would be inappropriate. Carbon pricing may be the simplest and
most transparent way for the public sector to address global
warming.204
Despite concerns over the accuracy of the SCC, the IWG
continues to study and improve the SCC. For example, in 2010 the
IWG calculated the estimates of the SCC for 2020 CO2 emissions as
being $7, $26, or $42 per ton emitted.205 However, in 2013 the IWG
recalculated the 2020 CO2 emissions cost to $12, $42, or $62 per ton
respectively.206 The SCC is still in its early stages and it will continue
to improve and become more accurate as scientific and economic
understanding improves.
The arguments against the inaccuracy and weight of the SCC may
have merit, but thus far have been inconsequential. Researchers have
examined the impact the addition of SCC has on regulations when
applied to a cost-benefit analysis.207 The results thus far have shown
minimal impact.208 According to a 2014 paper published by the
Brookings Institution, the SCC has been involved in 53 regulatory
policies.209 The application of the SCC has resulted to be only 14
percent of net benefits, on average, being accounted for reducing
carbon.210 Further, the application of the SCC has tipped the scales of
204

Jess Gaspar & Bill Jarvis, The Fiduciary Case for Carbon Expsoure
Management Now (Not Later), COMMONFUND INSIGHTS BLOG (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.commonfund.org/2016/10/18/post-carbon-exposure-management-now/.
205
Johnston, supra note 2, at 36.
206
Id.
207
Wihbey, supra note 1.
208
Id.
209
Robert W. Hahn & Robert A. Ritz, Does the Social Cost of Carbon Matter?
Evidence from US Policy, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 235 (2015).
210
Id. at 238.
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a cost-benefit analysis in roughly only one out of every eight rulemaking scenarios.211
Courts have started to face challenges to the SCC. The Ninth
Circuit correctly articulated that agencies must factor in the SCC in
cost-benefit analyses because failing to do so would mean the cost of
CO2 emissions is $0.212 The cost of CO2 emissions is certainly not $0
evidenced by the fact that there is wide acceptance of the fact that
CO2 emissions harm our climate.213 Harmful effects to the global
climate must be resulting in some sort of cost to the population. The
SCC gives agencies and the government an opportunity to measure
these harmful effects while also giving them an opportunity to correct
the harmful effects.
Without the SCC, agencies would not be able to quantify global
environmental harms. The SCC is beneficial and useful as a tool
because it mitigates CO2. For example, over the next forty years, three
vehicle rulemakings are projected to result in a benefit ranging from
$78 billion to $1.2 trillion.214
C. Courts Should Defer to Agencies Regarding SCC Use
The use of the SCC is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Courts
should use Chevron Doctrine when deciding cases regarding the use,
or non-use, of the SCC. In Zero Zone, Petitioners argued that that the
DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously when enacting the New
Standards Rule by including the SCC in its cost-benefit analysis. The
Seventh Circuit correctly held that the DOE acted within its powers.
211
212

2008).

Id. at 244.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (9th Cir.

213

Howard Shelanski & Maurice Obstfeld, Estimating the Benefits from
Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reductions, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/07/02/estimating-benefits-carbon-dioxideemissions-reductions.
214
The Social Cost of Carbon, ENV. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
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The scope of review for the arbitrary and capricious standard is
narrow.215 Courts should not substitute its judgment automatically so
as to agree with the agency.216 Instead, the court must examine the
relevant data and articulate as satisfactory explanation as to why the
court believes there is a rational connection between the facts found
and a choice made regarding the agency’s action.217
The arbitrary and capricious standard fails if the agency relies on
factors which Congress has not intended for the agency to consider.218
It may also fail if the agency has “entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.”219
Agencies that factor the SCC are trying to consider every
important factor in a CBA. This, however, does not mean that agencies
must apply the SCC.220 Agencies must consider the SCC to satisfy
statutory requirements.221 Agencies are mandated by the APA to pass
regulations which are not arbitrary or capricious.222 Furthermore, a
regulation may be arbitrary or capricious if the agency fails to consider
an important aspect of the problem, or if the agency fails to offer an
explanation for its decision that is counter to the evidence before the
agency.223 Greenhouse gas emissions result in detrimental effects on a
global scale. Agencies which fail to consider such effects are not
considering an important aspect of a global environmental problem.
215

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866–67 (1983).
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
See High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp.
3d 1174, 1193 (D. Colo. 2014).
221
5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-224).
222
Id.
223
Id.
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Additionally, if an agency believes that the SCC would be an
inappropriate factor in a cost-benefit analysis, the agency should
provide a basis for its conclusion.224 The Chevron Doctrine allows
courts to defer to executive agencies in situations where Congress has
not directly spoken to an issue.225 Congress has yet to take action
regarding the SCC, and therefore we must defer to agencies.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal court to uphold the use
of the SCC in a cost-benefit analysis. It is unlikely that this will be the
last court to rule on such an issue. The SCC is a controversial concept
because of the politics involved. Generally, political liberals hope to
preserve the environment and strive to implement ways to reduce
global pollution. Political conservatives generally strive to reduce the
burdens placed upon businesses. The SCC is likely to allow
regulations to survive scrutiny. However, the SCC is not a tool that
will allow agencies to pass any regulation they want. Instead, it is a
tool that will allow agencies to factor in negative global effects on the
environment.
Executive agencies should continue to develop the SCC. With
time, the SCC and the scientific and economic estimates behind it will
start to gain wide acceptance and, more importantly, consistency.
Experts should be striving to continue development of the SCC so the
potential per ton costs are not so wide ranging. Development of the
SCC is important to developing a functional regulatory framework as
well as to preserving the environment. The uncertainty regarding the
use of the SCC in a CBA should be resolved by Congressional action.

224
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(1984).

See High Country Conservation Advocates, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1193.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
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